Introduction:
Variable
geometry and multi-level governance are just two terms used to describe the
changing nature of territorial politics within the European Union. The creation
of the EU, and the associated process of economic, political and social
integration which has accompanied it, has changed the nature of nation state
and sub-national politics as it had been known for at least two centuries.
This essay seeks to evaluate some
of the changes that have occurred, particularly over the last two decades, and
which have resulted particularly in changing forms of sub-national politics
within the EU. Most specifically it will examine the extent to which the
essential distinction between Northern and Southern European styles of local
politics (see inter alia Page and Goldsmith: 1986; Goldsmith: 2000; John:2001)
is being undermined by the process of European integration and policy
Europeanisation to which Raedelli makes reference in this volume[i].
Last in this context it seeks to
evaluate briefly current explanations offered of political integration within
the European Union.
The essay will suggest that key
economic changes, some associated with globalisation, others with the
introduction of the Single Market, others with the process of deregulation that
has taken place over the last twenty years, have posed European cities and
regions with a constantly changing and often different set of challenges,
opportunities and constraints as they seek to manage the turbulent environments
in which they operate. It will also suggest that the political dynamic of the
EU, especially through the emergence of a strong regional policy, has
encouraged forms of cooperative sub-national politics which have subtly changed
both national intergovernmental relationships and those between the EU and nation
states.
Whilst recent developments may have
re-asserted the primacy of the nation state within the EU political system, the
essay argues that further expansion of the EU means that the system of
territorial politics in Europe remains
unstable and continual subject to change, especially at the sub-national level.
In particular, whilst the old styles of Northern and Southern local politics
remain, new cross-national networks of local and regional governments,
reflecting the experience of regional policy, together with the way in which
different cities and regions seek to be increasingly competitive in a global
market, means that territorial politics within the EU will remain unstable in
the forseeable future.
The essay will conclude by
evaluating the extent to which ideas such as variable geometry and multi -level
governance remain useful concepts in aiding our understanding of the processes
of change through which EU territorial politics are currently passing.
Conceptualising EU integration:
As a starting point it is useful to
review the different ways in which the EU integration has been conceptualised
by observers over recent years. Effectively there have been three main
approaches. The first, dominant in the early life of the EU, and elements of which
are important even today, perceives the process of European integration as an
international regime, designed by sovereign states, who seek to regulate the
development of economic and political interdependence through a process of
international collaboration. Given that the EU is a treaty based organisation –
as distinct to a federal or confederal system such as the United States, Canada
of Germany – it is first and foremost a state centred organisation, in
which the member states are at the centre of the decision making process.[ii] As
a result change comes about incrementally, with the most significant changes
brought about through a success of new Treaties such as those agreed in Maastricht (1992); Amsterdam
(1995) and Nice (2000). Decisions on policies and program, finance and
regulatory regimes are effectively ratified at the periodic meetings of the
Council of Ministers, at which heads of state have frequently negotiated
different terms to those originally proposed by the Commission, or have
negotiated opt out arrangements (Social Charter), won specific deals (Thatcher
and the budgetary rebate) or exercised a veto on proposals. For those (e.g. Hoffman 1982) who argue that
the EU conforms to such a model, control remains vested in the nation states
and changes depend on voluntary cooperation and bargaining between powerful
member states. One possible example in which this process can be seen is the
Nice agreement, under which it was the interest of the big states (eg Germany, France
and Britain)
which dominated the final form the treaty took. As writers such as Hooghe
(1996a, 177) suggest, decision making under this model is effectively elitist,
closed, opaque and not readily accountable – giving rise to a form of
institutional arrangements probably best characterised be de Gaulle’s phrase a
“Europe de Patries” rather than some other form of arrangement.
Whilst such a characterisation of
the EU might have been valid in its early years and up until the early
eighties, a number of factors have undermined the state centred model more
recently. First, there have been changes in the decision making rules, with the
introduction of Qualified Majority Voting on an increasing number of issue
areas, thus negating the veto power of
nation states in these areas. Second, the European Parliament now has a greater
say in decision-making than in the past, especially over the budget. Third, the
emergence of the European Court
as the arbiter on EU legal matters, in which its decisions are accepted by
member states, means that nation states no longer have sovereignty over many
areas formerly associated with state activities. Fourth, the growing process of
‘government by regulation’ through the regulatory decisions of the Commission
and of EU agencies again undermines the position of national governments. In
other words, whilst nation states remain the most important actors at the
centre of EU decision-making, their position is less strong than it was twenty
years ago.
The second model, often employed in
more normative debates about the EU, is essentially a federalist one, in which
the EU is a supranational state. It is usually described in the academic
literature as an intergovernmental model: in this model political decisions
depend on the relationships between different levels of government, and on how
the powers and functions allocated to the different levels operate in practice
in both formal and informal ways. Normatively this model comes closest to that
propounded by the advocates of a federal Europe,
or most often derided by Eurosceptics. Its strongest advocate could be found in
Jacques Delors during his time as President of the Commission, who thought of
the EU as having a strong supranational core (i.e. the Commission) working with
weakened nation states and a strengthened, but fragmented, regional periphery.
This model is Delors ‘Europe of the Regions’ writ large, giving rise to a
contested hierarchy as regions compete amongst themselves and with the nation
states over territorial representation, but with a powerful Commission at the
centre acting effectively as the policy arbiter, given its key position as the
policy initiator.
Such a view of the EU was more
prevalent in the late eighties and early 1990s, during a period when regional
policy and its associated expenditure levels were growing in importance. During
this period the Commission – as the supranational body, tended to promote the
regions and sub-national government generally, seeking to mobilise them on a
functional basis around a series of specific European wide issues (Tommel,
1998). And as regional policy grew in
importance so did the development of widespread functional and territorial
networks seeking to represent regional and local interests and to influence
Commission policy – indeed some of these networks were specifically encouraged
by the Commission itself in policy areas dealing with regional, environmental,
innovation / technology transfer and ITC issues. Cooke and Morgan: 1998; Simmie
2000).
Development of an EU model along
these lines would see a more pluralistic and competitive decision making
process, albeit one in which the Commission was central in what would otherwise
be a highly fragmented process. More open and accessible than the state centred
model, it would be no more accountable, however, as decisions would still be
taken behind the closed doors and in the corridors of the Commission.
A third model emerged in middle
nineties which characterised the EU as a system of multi-level governance, as
developed in the writings of authors such as Gary Marks and Lisbet Hooghe (see
for example Marks, Scharpf, Schmitter and Streek, 1996; Hooghe1996a; 1996b and
1998; Marks and Hooghe 2001). Hooghe
characterised this system as a ‘Europe with the Regions’ as distinct to Delors’
‘Europe of the Regions’. Here it is not only
the Commission, European Parliament, the Court of Justice, EU agencies and
national governments who are involved, but also regional and other sub-national
levels as well. The result is a system of decision-making in which there are multiple
access points, multiple opportunities to exercise influence and pressure, and
multiple places at which decisions are made. No predominant territorial
principle guides decision making, there is extensive sub-national mobilisation
across all sectors (including the third or voluntary sector) and the different
actors play a series of what are perhaps best thought of as grantsmanship
games. Decision making in this case is described by Hooghe (1996a) as
“pluralist with an elitist bias” in that only actors with valuable resources
can participate – in other words the playing field is not a level one for all
participants, and nation states can no longer act as gatekeepers able to close
off the European policy agenda and political arena.
This multi-level
governance model has attracted considerable attention in recent years (see
inter alia Smith; 1995; 1997; Benz), as well as
some criticism.
Conceptualising Europeanisation:
Here it is easiest to follow Raedelli (this volume),
even at the risk of simplification. First
and foremost, Europeanisation refers to the process by which increasing numbers
of policy arenas have taken on a European dimension as the process of European
integration has developed.[iii]
Such policy arenas are characterised by
the presence of a wide variety of actors, be they the Commission and its
directorates, national and sub-national governments and agencies, and national
and trans-national interest groups, brought together into a complex policy
network. Environmental policy provides an easy example – in the early sixties
there was little discussion of environmental policy at EU level – today it is a
major area for discussion amongst all the types of actors listed above and for
EU regulation. Regional policy, our focus here, was largely a national matter
until the early to mid eighties, but has been a major strand of EU policy since
that time – and was what brought sub-national units and their representative
bodies to Brussels
in such large numbers.. Agricultural policy has always been Europeanised ever
since the CAP came into being: when Britain
joined the National Farmers Union quickly transferred its attentions from Whitehall to Brussels.
On the other hand social policy has been
somewhat marginalised at the European level, with more change probably being
achieved through indirect regulation (for example in relation to the working
hours directive) than direct intervention in processes of income redistribution
or the provision of health care services. Both the latter remain by and large
firmly in the hands of national governments, though with some debate at the EU
level or some work undertaken within the Commission.
Second, Europeanisation can be used to describe the
process of regulation by which a wide variety of policy areas are subject to
regulations and directives agreed in Brussels, largely at the behest of the
Commission and accepted by member state governments – another form of policy
making. This process has been well-described by authors such as Majone (1996)
and Cram (1997), and involves sub-national
governments in the implementation and/or enforcement of a growing number of
such regulations across an increasing number of fields ranging from health and
safety through the environment to consumer standards and contracts.
Third, it is also clear that the Europeanisation of
policy arenas varies over time and with the agenda of the EU and its
institutions. For example, the debate within theEU between widening and
deepening during the 1990s has largely been resolved in favour of widening, by
bringing in Central and East European countries at some future point. Given
also decisions to limit the EU budget or at least to set it within certain
constraints, then changes in othere areas of EU policy making are likely to
follow. Top of the list must be the reform of the CAP, though this will no
doubt be difficult to achieve, given the heavy involvement of many present
Southern European EU members and of some prospective members in agriculture. As
we shall see regional policy has already undergone some changes, and the area
of ITC policy has moved from one of a concern with IT literacy in the early
1990s to one of communications regulation/deregulation today. Similarly, with
the creation of the single European Market, transport policy has moved up the
EU agenda, with concerns to de-regulate road haulage, to improve transport
infrastructure across the EU, and to improve competition in air transport.[iv]
Sub-national government in the EU Context:
Sub-national government in the EU member countries has
also changed markedly during the lifetime of the EEC/EU. One can identify a number of pressures which
have sought ot bring about change, most being designed to bring about some form
of decentralisation within nation states. First, there has been pressure from
below – what Loughlin (2000; Keating and Loughlin: 1997) would call
regionalism, in which sub-national territories, generally at the regional
level, have pressured national governments to give such territories (usually
claiming some nationalist status) a greater degree of autonomy. Two cases are
readily apparent – the emergence of the autonomous communities in Spain, especially Catalonia
and the Basque region, and the establishment of the Flemish and Wallonia
regions in Belgium.
In other cases this pressure has been a less direct cause of decentralisation –
as with devolution to Scotland
and Wales in Britain, or has met with less success – such as
the pressure for recognition by Bretons in Brittany
in France.
This kind of meso development can be thought as a process of bottom up
regionalism.
The second pressure has come from central
governments themselves, generally in the form of a gradual transfer of
functions from central to lower tier governments, and generally recognising a
strengthening of the intermediate or meso tier (Sharpe 1993). Scandinavian
reforms, for example, have seen such functions of health and social welfare
move down towards a strengthened county tier, and this move has also been
accompanied by a reduction in the number of municipal or bottom tier
governments (Albæk, Rose, Strómberg and Ståhlberg, 1991). In the early
seventies Britain followed down a similar path, though later moved in the
opposite direction as under succesive Conservative governments the British
political system became increasingly centralised, a trend reversed in parts
under the Blair Labour governments since 1997. France, with the
decentralisation reforms under Mitterand, went down a similar path in the
eighties, with the establishment of new ( largely weak) regional tier, a strengthening
of the departmental influence over the activities of the communes (especially
encouraging the development of inter-communal cooperation) and generally
strengthening the position of urban agglomerations and large cities
(Michel:1999).
Third, pressure has been external to the nation state
and reflects both increasing globalisation and changes encouraged through the
activities in the EU, especially the development of regional policies by the
Commission from the late eighties onwards. It was this latter development which
essentially gave rise to the multi-level goverance model (Hooghe 1996), and it
is a development which forms the substantive focus of this chapter.
However, even in this latter context, sub-national
governments found in the long-standing federal systems in the EU have also
undergone some change. Austria
and Germany
provide the examples. In both cases, it is the intermediate tier which is
strong and often influential in negotiations on EU matters. In the case of Germany for example, Hesse (1991) argues that
intergovernmental relaitons within the then West Germany took the form of a
cooperative federalism. Benz (2000) examining later experience in the
mid-nineties highlights the extent to which the German lander varied in the way
in which they dealt with things European.
In Austria
(add)
What has happenned at the EU level to bring about a
what is effectively a fourth tier to the intergovernmental relationship?.
First, there has been the general trend towards a more globalised economy, with
the resultant loosening ties between place and capital, the rise of
multi-national companies, worldwide shifts in manufacturing activity and
capacity, and changing technologies.[v]
All of these place nation states and their sub-national levels under pressure,
as regions and cities compete to maintain their place in the overall economic
hierarchy, seek to become more innovative and to find ways in which they can
compete in the global market place. (Cook and Morgan: 1998; Storper: 1997; ) At
the EU level, this process of change has resulted in the processes of European
integration and Europeanisation of policies gaining pace, especially in the
years up to the Maastricht Treaty. If that point in time brought about a
slowing down of formal processes of deepening
(integration) rather than widening or extending the EU to the East, it
has not stopped Europeanisation completely, and in the years before,
integration moved on quite rapidly. Four main sources of these processes are
apparent, driven essentially by moves towards the introduction of the Single
European Market, essentially the EU
response to the economic globalisation
processes just discussed. First, there was acceptance of the principle of
subsidiarity, adopted in the Maastricht Treaty, under which things are
(supposedly) done at the lowest possible level of government within the EU.
Second, there has been an increase in the process of decision making by
regulation within the EU, under which the Commission has been able to issue a
large number of directives which essentially change the way in which a
considerable number of policy actions are effectively determined – for example
in areas such as consumer protection; contracting; environmental control;
emplyoment law, and health and safety.
Third, in many cases these areas have been further
Europeanised by decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). As Hooghe and Marks (2001: 26-27) argue the
ECJ ‘has transformed the European legal order in a supranational direction.’ In
so doing, it has promoted European integration by establishing that the
Treaties on which the EU is based and through its own decisions are legally
superior to those of national courts, ie establshing the supremacy of European
over national laws. These latter have also accepted Article 234 (ex.77) of the
Treaty of Rome which allows them to seek ECJ guidance on cases involving
Community law, guidance which is rearly rejected. If such guidance is accepted,
then other national courts usually accept the decision as a precedent, so that
effectively ECJ rulings bind nation states. Yet the ECJ is not completely
autonomous, since it depnds on others – such as the Commission, lower courts or
other private actors bringing cases before it. Areas such as equal rights,
employment and consumer protection are all themes in which the ECJ has been
active and with impacts, inter alia,
affecting sub-national governments.[vi]
Last but for our purposes a major point of focus,
certain policy areas (regional, urban, innovation/exploitation) have had a
predominantly sub-national focus, being implemented at regional or local
levels. In the case of regional policy, the involvement of sub-national levels
has been heightened through the adoption of the partnership principle, in which
proposals for regional funding are developed on a partnerhsip basis between the
differnet levels of government and with cross sector partnerships at the
appropriate regional level, and where the implementation of the regional
programme is largely undertaken at the regional level and monitored at both
national and EU levels. The same policy focus has applied to some other policy
arenas – IT, urban and innovation policy being cases in point, though all of
these have had a link to regional policy
EU Regional Policy and Sub-National Government:
The last twenty years have seen the development of an
extensive regional policy within the EU, largely designed to promote the
cohesion of the union. What has been the key to this cohesion process has been
the use of the EU’s structural funds to aid the less developed/ economic
declining regions to help overcome their difficulties. That the more prosperous
parts of the EU have continued to grow, and that the gap between the richest
and poorest regions has not necessarily narrowed , is to some extent irrelevant
here – what is important is that EU regional policy and the structural funds
have been of significant benefit to some parts of the EU ( especially countries
like Ireland, Spain and Portugal) and have changed the relationship between
different levels of government within the EU and within the member states
generally across the board.(Tommel: 1997;
In some case, arguably, the process has helped, whereas in others the
impact has been marginal or even negative. What is also clear from a raft of
research is that the reaction of different regions and localities has been
different – in some cases regions, cities and municipalities have taken
advantage of regional policy to draw down significant funds and to heighten
their political status within the national and European political systems,
whereas in other cases almost the opposite has been true. (Bullman: 1994;
Balme: 1995; Rhodes: 1995; Smith:1995; Heinelt and Smith: 1996; Goldsmith and
Klaussen: 1997; Jeffrey: 1997;Le Gales and Lequesne: 1997; Desideri and
C and Sanantonio V (1996) Add to this the use of funds to promote cross
border cooperation through the INTERREG programme, and one finds new
spaces/territorities beginning to emerge slowly.
This variable reaction is not simply because the
Commission, in implementing regional policy, has defined eligibility criteria
which exclude some sub-national units whilst including others, a point to which
we shall return. Rather has it to do with the way in which different countries
have sought to operate the EU regional policy themselves and the different
status which sub-national units have in different countries, as well as their
resopnsive capacity. (Goldsmith and Klaussen: 1997) These persisting cultural differences are
important in understanding the variable geometry of the EU.
The Operation of EU Regional Policy:
EU regional policy has operated in two different
senses – formal, in terms of the definition and use of the structural funds,
and informal, by which we refer to processes designed to amend the operation of
regional policy, and ways in which the Commission in particular has sought to
develop the regional level. First, however, we need to understand the
Commission’s interest in both these matters.
As I have argued elsewhere, (Goldsmith: 1993) the Commission’s interest
in working with sub-national governments derives not just from the formal
objectives and imperatives of integration, but also from informal objectives
and poliical processes. At one level the Commission works with sub-national
governments because it needs information on policy needs and processes as an alternative
to that provided from national governments and from other interested parties.
Indeed different directorates of the Comission have themselves sponsored a
large number of networks and activities which bring sub-national governments
into contact – with many of them being only to willing to take up these
opportunities, giving rise to a form of clientelistic rlelationship at times.
Not only do these networks provide an opportunity to exchange information, they
provide an opportunity for the Commission to introduce new policy experiments.
Second, the Commission faces problems of
implementation of its policies. Despite
cries and complaints about the Brussels
bureacracy, it remains small, and very dependent on others for implementation.
Whilst implementation is often seen as the responsibility of national governments, in many cases detailed
implementation is decentralised to lower levels of government or other
agencies. Given that one major way through which both integration and policy
development effectively takes place is through regulatory processes (Cram:
1997; Majone: 1996; Wallace and Wallace: 1996; Young and Wallace:2000), then it
is through the implementation of regulations and directives that such changes
occur. Policy arenas such as environment, consumer protection and trading
standards, contracting and transport all provide examples of areas in which EU
regulation has been important and where sub-national governments have had the task of securing compliance with the new
regulations.
Within this context, how has EU regional policy
operated? The highpoint was during the Delors years, from the mid-eighties
until the late nineties. Using the structural funds, the Commission has been
concerned from mid-eighties onwards to reduce regional and social disparities
within the EU. Our concern here is with the use of two funds – the European
Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund[vii],
since these were most applicable to sub-national governments. Before 1988,
these funds were largely used to fund nationally determined projects, though
some Commission initiatives ( Interreg and the integrated developed projects
for example) were both more European wide and began to bring about a direct
relationship between the Comission and sub-national governments. Reform of
these funds led to the introduction of co-ordinated multi- annual programmes
designed to promote economic development in the poorer areas of the European
Union, using as a criteria for defining such regions the standard NUTS scheme
to classify regions and taking as the poorest those with a GDP below a defined
level for the Euroepan average (75% in the first case). Different levels of
funding were then attached to those areas who qualified under the
classification for funding – those who were identified as Objective 1 regions
receiving more funding than those in Objective 2 areas, who in turn received
more than Objective 5 areas. The reform of the structural funds greatly increased
the amount of EU funding going to support
these elements of cohesion policy
– doubling in the period 1987 to 1993, and doubling again for the period
1994-1999 – or 32% of the EU budget by the end of the second period.[viii]
Significant funds to play for, and as good grantsmanship players, those
eligible quickly joined the game.
Furthermore, there were two further reforms or shifts
in the policy. First, the funds were designed to promote economic development
rather than supporting large-scale
infrastructure development and investment incentives, including significant
funding for training and technology transfer. Second, there was an important change in the decision
making and implementation arrangements for the use of the funds. The new
decision making arrangements supported the idea of partnership between the
different actors involved. In other words rather than simply giving national
governments what were effectively blank
cheques to support naitonally determined initiatives, the post 1989 use of the
funds required proposals to come forward on the basis of an agreed strategy
between national governments and the eligible regions, and at the regional
level the funds also required partnerships between the public and private
sectors along with the voluntary sector where appropriate. [ix]
Such changes meant that sub-national governments (especially regional but also
city,county and municipal) became legitimate actors in this game, a process
reinforced by the adoption of the subsidiarity principle at Maastricht in 1992,
which also recognised the importance of sub-national governments in the process
by offering them consultative status through the Committee of the Regions[x](Tommel:
1998).
Not surprisingly, in addition to those regions located
in the poorest part of the EU, (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Southern Italy and
Spain), significant other regions came to be included – especially as Objective
2 regions were to be found in those areas most heavily hit by the process of
industrial re-structuring associated with economic change in the early eighties
– mainly those regions linked to such industries as coal, steel, shipbuilding
and textile manufacturing in countries like Belgium, France, Italy, and UK.
After the re-unification of Germany,
former east European areas such as Saacshen Anhalt became eligible for funding,
and post 1995, parts of Finland,
Sweden and Austria were
also identified for funding. In addition, with the growing use of INTEREG
arrangements, as well as funds for Objective 5, other areas found themselves playing
on the European stage – and recognised the need to organise themselves to do so
effectively.
Thus early in the nineties two developments were
becoming apparent. At the national level, some regions were better at the game
than others –thus for example in the UK it was Glasgow, Birmingham, later
Manchester and Liverpool, amongst the cities which learnt the new rules and
appreciated the game quickest, whilst regionally Scotland and Wales were better
at exploiting the funds available than were parts of England. Elsewhere,
quickly on the scene were the ‘Four Motors’, (Rhones-Alpes, Baden-Wurtemburg,
Lombardy and Catalonia), seeking to establish
themselves at the economic heart of the new Europe
(Kukawka: 1996). Simlarly Lille and Nord Pas du Calais took advantage of
Objective 1 funding and of the INTERREG rules to link up with Kent in England to exploit the building of
the Channel Tunnel, whilst Dutch municipalities on the border of the country
also exploited INTERREG. Barcelona
exploited its status as an Objective 1 area to secure extensive funding to
assist the developments necessary to hold the Olympic Games in 1992. (Morata:
1996). Wallonia in Belgium, together with coal mining areas in Britain, Lille
in France also benefited from their activities in the Coal Communities
Campaign, which sought support successfully from the Commission to help
regenerating the dying coalmining areas of Europe.Outside the Objective 1 and 2
, it was areas like Cornwall in Britain which were to the fore in exploiting
Commission funds, as well as those associated with the Atlantic Arc, the large
number of regions and municipalities from Portugal to Ireland whose coastlines
bordered the Atlantic, who, although not eligible for large amounts of funding,
recognised by working together they could obtain support and recognition of
their needs within the wider Union as early as 1989. (Brouard: 1996; Guesnier:
1993; Smith:1995)
By the early nineties, cross EU sub-national groupings
were beginning to emerge, such as EUROCITIES ( a grouping of second cities
across the EU); the Asssociation of Euroean Municipalities and Regions, as well
as more narrowly based bodies such as RETI (originally cities and regions based
on traditional industries, but who now stress their technological and innovatory
strengths) and MILAN ( a motor industry network) were coming into being. And
like all good pressure groups, individually and collectively, they recognised
that under Delors the Commission was where much of the action took place – and
thus that Brussels
was the place to be. The nineties saw a rapid growth in the number of offices
opened in Brussels
by cities and regions across the EU and by their associations. They quickly developed a working relationship with the various
Commission directorates – who themselves
recognised the growing importance of the structural funds as possible resources
for their own initiatives – so that they worked with those who were also
seeking to exploit the funds for their own purposes. And these groups quickly
realised that if they could influence and shape
the agenda rather than reacting to it or simply seeking early warning of
new developments, then the opportunity arose for them to shape policy so that
it suited their ends rather than those of others. By the mid-to late
nineties, estimates suggested that there were over 160 such offices in Brussels (John:2001, 87)
Of course it is possible to overestimate the
importance of these developments. Brussels,
as the centre of EU activity was and is a honeypot for those seeking to
influence policy. In this respect the city has the same village like qualities
as Washington,
as groups exchange gossip, information and trade influence and ideas.
Sub-national governments were only one such category of interest groups amongst
many to be found there. And, as we have
noted, the Commission and its directorates generally welcomed them, founding,
linking, helping such networks to flourish[xi].
By the mid to late nineties, this activity had reached
its peak. People began to talk as if Delors’ ‘Europe
of the Regions’ was in place. The new Committee of the Regions had been
established and was offering its opinions formally on a wide range of issues.
Regions, counties and cities across Europe
were involved at the sub-national level in developing a series of partnerhsips
to exploit the structural funds, and national governments were having to
recognise this change. And many such sub-national governments were beginning to
engage in what some authors have called ‘paradiplomacy’ (Aldecoa and Keating:1999)
- that is to say establishing offices in Brussels and joining in bi or multi
lateral discussions/relationships with their opposites across Europe, and
joining European wide bodies such as AERM and EUROCITIES. To the fore of this
development were the Lander in Germany;
Flanders and Wallonia in Brussels, as well as Catalonia in Spain. Scotland
and Wales
were also present. In the case of the German and Belgian regions, these were
permitted to represent their country at Council of Ministers meetings (Jeffrey:
1997; Kerrelmans:2000).[xii]
Nevertheless, change was afoot: Amsterdam
in 1996 was the turning point.
Amsterdam resolved – at least in the mid-term – arguments
amongst the member states about how the
EU should develop in future. First, if the creation of the Single European
Market; the adoption of the subsidiarity princple and regional policy had been
about closer Euroepan integration (deepening the EU),then the quesiton of
extending embmership to countries in central and east Europe was about widening
the EU. Second, member states were showing signs of the increasing costs of
financing the EU, a problem not entirely resolved by the accession of three new
members – Austria, Finland and Sweden – in 1995. Third, the
enlarged post 1995 Union was faced by continuing
problems of decision making in the Council of Ministers and the need to extend
the principle of qualified majority voting. Fourth, as the most expensive
elements in the EU budget, both the CAP
and regional policies were due for review. In the light of the Amsterdam decision to widen rather than deepen the EU, and to do so at
minimum cost to the EU budget, both these latter policies were likely to
suffere financial cuts. Additionally, as the Comission’s DG 16 in charge of
regional policy gained more experience in the implementation of regional
policy, it was beginning to change the rules of the game, tightening up the
decision making processes and setting tougher targets and auditing programmes
more carefully.
In such a context, it was perhaps inevitable that the
post 1999 form of the structural funds would be different and that regional
policy would be effectively downgraded amongst EU policy priorities, reflecting
the fact that policy arenas rise and fall in importance. Though both the Committee of the Regions and
both transnational organisations representing regional interests fought to
retain regional policy funding levels, as did several national groupings, their
success was limited (John and McAteer: 1998). The Committee of the Regions had
little impact and little influence (McCarthy:1997), specialist groups, such as
RETI perhaps a little more, since their efforts were at least partially
encouraged by DG 16, itself seeking to
retain its place in the sun. In the end, whilst regional policy remained in
place, as did the Objective One areas (albeit with tougher criteria to meet),
the post 1999 situation effectively redefined the boundaries of Objective 2
areas so that they covered larger territory, and with funding which was
designed to aid their withdrawal symptoms over the next few years.
A variety of reasons can be advanced for this change.
First and foremost was the general weakness of sub-national governments within
the EU policy and decision making structures overall. Despite the appearance of
influence and stature, they were always dependent on the support of national
governments and their agendas, as well as on that of the Commission, which
itself was enjoying an unprecedented role in EU decision making in the late
eighties and early nineties. In part the change was a step back from the new
multi-level governance and also a clearer recognition of the continuing
importance of the dominant position of the nation state in EU decision making.
The position of the Commission was not helped by the scandals which surrounded
it in 1998 and the wholesale resignations of commissioners, the latter demanded
and achieved by the European Parliament, which itself was seeking to test its
own powers.
More simply perhaps was the fact that sub-national
governments themselves varied in their capacity to operate on the European
level, singly and collectively. Not all
regions, cities and municipalities were equal to the task – either
organisationally, or in terms of their leadership and interest in things
European (Goldsmith and Klaussen: 1997; Bache and Jones:2000). Those generally
well-known regions and cities which had adapted early to the game, had
benefitted from the structural funds over time, still operate at the EU level –
but for how long? If the money goes away, what would keep them as players at
this level? And what do these changes mean for the nature of EU integration,
Europeanised policy making and multi-level governance, and for the future shape
of territorial politics in Europe?
Some concluding remarks:
At one level the answer to some of these
questions is simple – not all that much.
At another level, the answer is more complicated. To take the simple answer first, the processes
of EU policy and decision making will continue, albeit in a context of a changing
balance of power between the participating institutions and changing rules of
the decision making game. What we have
seen since Amsterdam
is a re-assertion of the dominant position of national governments in the EU
decision making processes and a change in their priorities at the Council of
Ministers…widening rather than deepening is its simple expression. But the routines
of policy and decision making continue across the board and not just for the
major issues with which the Council of Ministers concerns itself.
In such a context, sub-national governments
continue to be involved, though perhaps not on the same scale as when cohesion
policy was at its height. Most importantly, as the Commission and the ECJ
continue to produce continuing directives, regulations and decisions, the
burden of implementation on sub-national governments is likely to increase
rather than diminish, and across a range of policy arenas. Siimilarly the arrival of new members of the
EU from central and east Europe will, as several commentators have noted
(Goldsmith:2000; John 2001: 91), provide new opportunities for the mobilisation
of sub-national governments within the EU – indeed expectation of such events
has already produced some such developments, generally encouraged by the
Commission.[1]
But at another level, the answer is more
complicated. Even though it has moved forward towards being a more bounded
political system, the EU remains a weakly linked system by comparison with
other (federal) systems in Europe and North America.
In this context it shares more in common with national federal systems in
Europe in which it is the intermediate tier which remains relatively powerful –
as is the case in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. It is these national
levels which determine the speed of formal political integration in Europe, whilst the process of Europeanising public policy
arenas brings about a process of informal integration – in the sense that
differing elites become accustomed to the process of working together and learning
from each other. For sub-national governments, it may well be that the
cross-national learning process is almost as important as the finance they
receive, though undoubtedly the latter helps.
Such a process brings about the exchange of
values and ideas about how politics works, challenging established orders and
practices. These changes are largely incremental and slow, and national
characteristics and values remain predominant. At the sub-national level, not
all things are equal or the same, but the frame of reference within which a
proactive region or city operates in Europe has been one set on a European and
international scale as such places seek to maintain or improve their position
in the world economic hierearchy. Whilst
some regions, cities and municipalities choose to remain as they are or feel
incompetent or impotent in the face of widespread change, others tackle change
head on and in colalboration with others. What Balme and LeGales (1997) called
the ‘bright stars’ adapt and change and in so doing they bring about change in
the way in which local politics operates in Europe, so that old distinctions
between North and South in terms of welfare systems, modes of operation
(clientelistic versus non-clientelistic) are no longer as valid as they were
ten or twenty eyars ago. (Goldsmith:2000; John: 2001).
What is clear is that the experience of working within
Europe for many cities and municipalities has
changed the way they operate. Traditional cultural imperatives which led to the
distinction between Northern and Southern political styles are no longer quite
as important as they were: cross national experience leads cities and
municipalities to think about and do things differently. The examples of the
Four Motors, the Atlantic Arc group, as well as the many INTEREG cooperations
simply mean that regional and local governments are increasingly aware of
different ways of doing things. Notwithstanding the funding made available
under the structural funds, the Commission and its directorates also encouraged
extensive exchange of experience, distribution of best practice and
considerable cooperative working amongst sub-national units on a trans-national
basis (see inter alia Hingel: 1993). Extending the EU into central and eastern
Europe simply brings more players into the game at all levels, putting
traditonal values and methods under even greater pressure.
This is not to suggest that change is rapid or that
old distinctions are no longer valid. What it does do is to suggest, as authors
such as Keating (1997), Goldsmith (2000) and John (2001) is that territorial
politics throughout Europe is in a state of
flux. In other words territorial politics within Europe
and inside the EU are unstable, changing, and likely to remain so for the
forseeable future.
In the process of globalisation and
Europeanisation, national governments, as well as those operating at
sub-national levels, have learnt that singly their influence is limited, and
that they are largely dependent on collaboration with others to achieve change. The EU is not about hierarchies, but about
networks and interdependence in an ever-changing environment. Some of these
networks are extremely formal, reflecting the operation of the formal
institutions of the EU, whilst others – especially in the policy areas – are
often far less formal, and in many ways no less important. In this sense EU
governance is supranational.
Explaining this European system of
governance – giving it a theoretical basis – continues to challenge social
scientists. The different models – state centred, intergovernmental,
multi-level governance – all have at least descriptive validity of the
processes and relationships which they seek to explain. In so far as the EU
continues to be dominated by discussions amongst member states at the national
level; in so far as the EU institutions such as the Commission, Parliament and
the ECJ continue to be weak, and in so
far as effective formal decision making depends on the acceptance of new
treaties at the Council of Ministers, then the state centred model remains
valid. And in so far as policy and decision making processes reflect
hierarchical relationships between the Commission, national governments and
sub-national units, involving a process of bargaining and negotiation between
the different levels, then
intergovernmentalist approaches have validity. And in so far as these
relationships involve informal networks cross-cutting the hierarchies and
national boundaries, then the multi-level governance approach provides
insights.
To describe the processes as one involving
variable geometric relationships is both insightful and arcane. It is
insightful because the phrase captures the very essence of an almost constantly
changing set of relationships over time[xiii]. It is
arcane in that because we do not fully know the rules and principles underlying
the geometry, so that we lack a sound
theoretical basis for understanding the EU, its political insitutions
and its politics. In this concept the need for new concepts and ideas remains
imperative (Marks et al: 1996; Scharpf: 1999; Rosamond:2000; Hooghe and Marks:2001).
[1] Such activity is part of the preparation for
future membership. Before Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995, they
had been involved in a number of EU
activities. Yet their degree of preparation was variable – Finland quickly active in Brussels
and its networks, Austria
and Sweden
less so.
[i] Some authors place considerable weight on the
process of Europeanisation of policy as a sign that a supranational form of
governance is emerging within Europe – see for
example Sandhotlz and Stone Sweet (199). This author prefers to maintain a
distinction between formal integration, as evidenced through the treaty
processes and acceptance of European Court decisions, and a more informal
process of integration through the Europeanisation of public policy within the EU, as well as
other more informal social processes –travel, cultural, educational which EU
citizens increasingly enjoy.
[ii] Again it is important to
distinguish this process from the emergence of a supranational set of
institutions, as associated with authors such as Stone Sweet and Sandhotltz
(1998). The author returns to this question in the concluding section.
[iii] The extent to which this process has developed is well brought out by
Fligstein and McNichol (199).
[iv] The crisis in the air
carrier industry following the September 11th 2001 terrorist attack
on New York City
is a good example, with several large national carriers seeking EU financial
aid and national governments seeking EU permission to support their own
national carriers.
[v] The author is very aware
that the globalisation is neither new nor complete – see for example Hirst and
Thompson (1996) . Nevertheless, these general trends are sufficiently forceful
to encourage a process of adaptation at all territorial levels. For an example of how far territorial
politics in Europe are indeed fragmented and
changing see Keating (1997).
[vi]Whether this goes so far as
to establish an EU constitution is debatable – see Shaw (1999) and references
cited therein for a discussion of this point which is outside the scope of this
chapter.
[vii] As Hooghe (1996:3) rightly notes, three funds
were involved – the Agricultural Fund underpinning the Common Agricultural
Policy was the third. For a discussion of the regional impact of the CAP see
Dudek C (2001).
[viii] These figures do not take into account either
a special cohesion fund designed to help the four poorest countries between
1994 and 1999, nor additional monies set aside to assist with the integration
of Austria,
Finland and Sweden from 1995.
[ix] For a detailed discussion of these changes
and their operation until the mid-nineties see especially Hooghe L (ed) (1996a)
[x] The impact of this new body is discussed
briefly below.
[xi] The author has some
personal experience of this activity. In the mid nineties he chaired a pan EU
network made up of universities, chambers of commerce, regional and city
governments and technology transfer/innovation centres under the RETI umbrella,
which was able to benefit on several occasions from Commission largesse.
[xii] Even in highly centralised Britain, following devolution Scotland has on occasion taken its
places at the Council of Ministers. (Foreign Office spokesman: 6th
November 2001).
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