*DISCLAIMER*
The
notes below are adapted from the Kenyatta University, UoN and Moi University Teaching module
and the students are adviced to take keen notice of the various legal
and judicial reforms that might have been ocassioned since the module
was adapted. the laws and statutes might also have changed or been
repealed and the students are to be wary and consult the various
statutes reffered to herein
EVIDENCE
OF CHARACTER
Character
of a witness means not only the witness’s disposition but his/her general
reputation in the community. When
admissible generally character affects the credibility of the witness. Section 58 of E.A. defines Characters as
follows:
“Character
denotes both disposition as well as general reputation of a person
disposition
refers to the inherent qualities of a person and these are the qualities that a
person acquires through their up bringing,; education or material conditions in
life. Essentially the argument is that you are going to be predisposed to act
in a particular way because of the way you were brought up, or because of how
you live and your education and the material condition in which you grew
up. The way to tell a person’s
disposition is thro observing that person.
This is a person’s inclination, how are they likely to behave under
particular circumstances?
Reputation
is more specific than disposition, it refers to the general estimation with
which a person is held. For instance you
may have the reputation of being a liar and people will perceive of you as
someone who lies. These will be people
with whom you work and people who know you generally. It is the net effect of the interaction that
you have with other people. With
disposition, you have no control over, you could try but a lot of it has to do
with what one is predisposed to but with reputation it is the way the people perceive
of you.
Definition
of character at S. 58 is traceable in English legal history. There is no distinction here between
reputation and disposition and they are used interchangeably as if they were
the same. Amongst the early English
cases that conceded the evidence of character is the case of
R v. Rowtown(1865) LJMC 57
In
this case the accused was charged with indecent assault and he gave evidence of
his good moral character. The
prosecution to rebut this evidence of this good moral character called a person
who testified that he had no knowledge of the neighbourhood’s opinion but his
own opinion was that the accused was a man capable of the grossest indecency
and the most flagrant immorality. He said that this is also the opinion of his
brothers who were the accused’s pupils held.
The question was whether this evidence admissible. The court held that it was not admissible
because it was based on the witness’s own opinion as opposed to the opinion of
the community. There was a dissent and
two judges dissented arguing that the evidence ought to have been admitted
because it was based on the witness’s intimate knowledge of the accused rather
than that of the community. The court
was still of the view that since it was not a general neighbourhood opinion, it
was not admissible.
In this case the court was overemphasising the
need for big numbers to hold a similar view before the evidence could be
admitted. Courts seem to use disposition
and reputation interchangeably and it seems confusing.
Malindi v. R (1967) 1 AC 93
When
is the evidence of character admissible?
There
is a distinction between criminal and civil cases.
CIVIL
CASES
In
civil cases the general policy is to reject evidence of the character of the
parties and this is provided for in Section 55 of the Evidence Act. It contains the principle that in civil cases
in general, evidence of the character of the parties will be rejected. Evidence of Character in civil cases cannot
be lead to establish the commission of a wrong by a person nearly by bringing
their character before the court. The
argument is that the business of the court is to try the case before the
court. One is not supposed to be
interrogating or inquiring into a person’s entire life and if one brings
extraneously details about the person’s character you are making a person
defend their whole lives. The general
principle is that in civil cases, evidence of character will not be
admissible. There are however 3
incidences when it will be admitted
(a)
When such character is
in issue or directly relevant to the issue; for example where you have a libel
suit and justification is pleaded, then the person pleading justification must
be permitted to show that the person instituting the libel suit is of the
character presented in the alleged libellous matter. S. 55 (1) …
section 5 is relevant here, evidence of character will be admitted where
the character is in issue or directly
(b)
When the character is
such as to affect the quantum of damages
Section 12 is authority as well as Section 55(2) an example is again a defamation suit which
is vindication of a person’s reputation.
If you can show that a person has not reputation, than is relevant to
the quantum of damages. Evidence of
character will be admissible in this case.
(c)
The character of a
witness is always relevant to his credit.
Section 154 of the E.A. cross
examination as to credibility. Accuracy,
veracity and character. Where it is
relevant in determining the credibility of the witness.
Outside
those 3 incidences, then own cannot call for evidence of character.
CRIMINAL
CASES
A
distinction in criminal cases is made between evidence of good character and
evidence of bad character in S. 56 the fact that an accused person is of good
character is admissible and the admissibility of the good character evidence
pertaining to the accused person has reigned even before 1898, i.e. the period
when the accused person was not competent to testify. Before the accused person
was competent to testify the evidence of good character went to establish their
disposition that being a good person you were unlikely to have stolen or
murdered etc. for example if an accused
person was accused of stealing that would call on the court to investigate the
matter. After the accused was made a
competent witness, then evidence of good character went to credibility than to
their likelihood of having committed an offence.
Section
56 states that evidence of good character is admissible. After statutes made the accused competent in
1898 the accused was given an option to testify or not to testify and this put
the accused person in a dilemma, if he chose not to testify, an adverse
inference might be drawn or could be drawn against him. People may draw an inference that one who
refused to testify has something to conceal.
On
the other hand, if they chose to testify and had a previous record, they could
be cross-examined from the previous records and this is why you have in the CPC
and the Constitution the right to silence on the part of the accused person
which is meant to guarantee that the right to keep silent is not going to
invite an inference that something will be held against you. The prosecution has no right to comment on
the silence of an accused person.
It is explicitly provided that the
prosecution has not right to comment on the silence of an accused person. S. 77
mandates an accused to keep silent.
The question has arisen that since the
prohibition of commenting is on the prosecution, can the judge comment. Under S. 127 (2) (3) and in the case of
R v. Bathhurst (1968) 2 QBD 99
This case considered the question whether
prohibition binds the judge. The judge
could only properly tell the jury that
(i)
The accused has a right
not to testify;
(ii)
They must not assume
that the accused is guilty because he does not testify even though they have
been deprived of the chance to test the story told in cross-examination.
If the accused person chose not to testify,
it should not be made a subject by the prosecution but if the accused person
opts to testify, he is treated like an ordinary witness and can be
cross-examined.
What is the provision of law on how one
deals with the witnesses?
Section
In the case of
Maxwell v. DPP (1935) AC
In that case it was intimated that the
accused person had a shield protecting him from cross examination from previous
record or antecedents unless he threw the shield away or unless the evidence of
such previous records or antecedents had a bearing of guilt on the present
case. Examples of ways in which an
accused could throw the shield away
(i)
If he gave evidence of
his good character he would be deemed to have thrown the shield away
(ii)
If he cast aspersions on
the reputation of the prosecutor or the complainant he would be said to have
thrown the shield;
(iii)
If he gave evidence
against a co-accused with whom they were charged with the same offence.
It would seem that apart from these 3
incidents the accused would be treated like an ordinary witness and could not
be asked irrelevant questions.
Sections 156 and 57
S. 57 and 156 embody these rules.
In cross examination a person can be asked
any question and it does not matter that that question is incriminating. Under S. 57 evidence or cross examination of
an accused on bad character evidence is inadmissible unless one of the 5
exceptions to that section apply.
S. 57 (2)
in criminal proceedings, the fact that the accused person has committed
or been charged with an offence other than that with which …
Bad character evidence is inadmissible
unless one of the 5 exception apply
Scholars of evidence have tried to explain
away the apparent contradiction and Sir Cross on Evidence tries to reconcile
those views by saying that under S. 156 one would have to be looking at the
narrow construction of the contradiction limiting S 156 to instances where
questions permitted would incriminate the accused person directly and
disallowing those that do not incriminate him indirectly.
The other view is the broader construction
where both direct and indirect incriminations are allowed irrespective of
whether the accused has thrown or not thrown away the shield. The contradiction remains as we do not yet
have a judicial interpretation. There is
no definitive rendition.
Section 57 has exception.
Unless
The five sections of S. 57 (aa) to (d) under S. 57 1(aa) evidence of bad character
will be admissible as evidence of fact in issue
Where it comprises similar fact evidence,
Section 57 (1) (a) provides that it will be inadmissible unless …
R V.
Cockar
Cockar was charged with breaking and
entering with intent to steal. In his defence
he alleged that he had entered for the sake of warmth and sleep. Evidence was adduced of a similar charge in
the past where he had also pleaded for similar evidence and had been acquitted
of that similar charge. He was convicted
based on the evidence of the previous antecedent and he appealed on the ground
that the conviction was based on inadmissible evidence of the previous
offence. The court held that the
conviction should be quashed because the matters relating to the previous
antecedent did not result in conviction and was therefore outside the purview
of the English equivalent of Section 57 (1) (a).
The court is saying here that for similar
fact evidence to be admissible as an exception to S 57 (1) (a) it has to have
been a conviction.
Section 57 (1) (b)
Evidence of bad character is admissible
where the accused has personally or by his advocate asked questions of a
witness for the prosecution with a view to establishing his own good character
then he could be questioned on bad character.
Here we go back to S. 56 where we said that evidence of good character
is admissible but it lays the path open for prosecution to counter that
evidence. If an accused person is
telling the court that he is a good evidence, the prosecution can show the
court that he is not such a good person after all. The accused lays himself bare for the
prosecution to show the court that he is not as good as he alleges.
Maxwell v. DPP
Maxwell a medical doctor was charged with
illegally procuring an abortion. He
denied the offence and stated that he had a good clean moral life and upon his
assertion that he had a good clean moral life, the trial judge allowed the
prosecution to cross-examine him on another charge where he had been charged
with procuring an abortion but he had been acquitted. It was held that the previous charge was not
evidence of bad character because it did not result in a conviction. But over and above that the court stated
“if the prisoner by himself seeks to give
evidence of his own good character for the purpose of showing that it is
unlikely that he committed the offence charged, he raises by way of defence an
issue as to his good character so that he may be fairly cross-examined on that
issue to show the contrary. The reasons
that you have cross examination on the accused is for two purposes
(i)
To demolish the defence
that the accused puts forward and this
goes to the issue;
(ii)
To demonstrate that the
accused is an unreliable person even on oath, so this goes to credit.
The accused walks a very tight rope and one
wonders whether this Section 57 intended to hamper the accused defence and case
law is to the effect that when an accused person denies an offence or asserts
that he is innocent does not assert to good character. Mere denial of an
offence or assertions of innocence should not be construed as good character as
this would incapacitate the accused from preparing a defence and a line has to
be drawn between mere denials as against assertions of good character.
R. V. Ellis (1910) 2 QB
Ellis dealt with antiques and was charged
with obtaining cheques from customers by false pretences concerning the cost
price of the antiques. He cross-examined
prosecution witnesses with a view to showing that his conduct towards the
customers was not consistent with an intention to defraud. The prosecution sought the court’s leave to
cross-examine him on previous antecedents but the court declined pointing out
that the accused by examining the prosecution witnesses was not asserting his
good character. He was attempting to establish his innocence.
If the accused person gives reasons for his
innocence dependent on the court’s assumption that he is an honest man, then
this can amount to evidence of good character (to what purport is this evidence
that the accused person is giving what assumption does he want the court to
have?)
R V. Samuel (1956) 40 C.A. R 8
Ali bin Hassan v. R
R v Winfield
The accused was charged with indecently
assaulting a woman. evidence was given
of the accused good character. He had a
previous conviction for larceny. The
court allowed the prosecution to cross-examine him on his previous antecedent
much as this was a trial for assault and the question was whether this was
proper. The court held Yes because there
is no such things in legal procedure as putting a part or a fraction of a
prisoners character in issue and leaving the other part. A prisoner that puts his character in issue
must be deemed to have put his
whole character in issue.
This issue was carried further in Stallen
v. DPP
On a charge of forgery an accused person
put his good character in issue by saying in cross-examination that he had
never been charged with any offence. The
prosecution asked him in cross-examination whether on leaving a certain
employment, he had been question about an alleged forgery. The accused denied. He was convicted and he
appealed. And the court held that the accused may be cross-examined as to any
evidence given in the examination in chief including statements as to his good
character. The court went on to state “an
accused who puts his character in issue must be regarded as putting the whole
of his character in issue. He cannot assert his good character in certain
respects without exposing himself to an inquiry about the rest of his record so
far as that tends to disprove claim of goods character.” When one puts their good character in issue,
the court is entitled to know about your whole character because you have
brought it forth.
What happens when it is not the accused who
asserts his own character but a witness without any prompting, with this open
up the accused person to be interrogated on his good character.
R V. Reid (1923) 1 KB 104
Which answered this question by asserting
that such an occurrence does not entitle the prosecution to bring in previous
antecedents.
57(1) © - where nature or conduct of the
defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the complainant
or of a witness for the prosecution. If
an accused person raises an issue in his defence that casts aspersions on the
complainant or witness he can be questioned on the good character
Rivers
Artheston Royston V. R
The accused was charged with obtaining
money by false pretences from various persons.
He admitted receiving the money but denied using false pretences. In cross examining the prosecution witness
with a view to furthering his defence, to the charge of false pretences, he
cast aspersions on their characters. The
court thereupon allowed the prosecution to cross examine him on his previous
antecedent. He was convicted and
appealed against conviction on the ground that the previous antecedents were
wrongly admitted. The court of Appeal
held that the previous antecedents were wrongly admitted and in their words,
“where imputations involving the character of prosecution witnesses are an
integral part of the defence, without which the accused cannot put his case
before the jury, fairly and squarely, he cannot be cross-examined on his
previous criminal history. (this is what
is being referred to as an integral part of the defence)
Omondi V. R (
The Appellants were charged with robbery
with violence. During cross examination
the first appellant suggested that the Police Sergeant who had given evidence
against him was deliberately committing perjury. Thereafter the court allowed the prosecution
to put questions to the first Appellant touching on his first convictions. The Appellants were convicted. They appealed challenging admissibility of
evidence of past convictions. The court
held that to challenge the evidence of a witness for the prosecution is not to
cast aspersions on the character of the witness within the meaning of S.
57. the court emphasised the latter part
of Section 57 (1) (c) which in their wording meant that if the defence involves
a proposition that the jury ought not believe the prosecution, or one of he
witnesses for the prosecution, then the jury also needs to know what kind of
character the prisoner has. It looks
like in this case the line is very thin, if you are saying that the witness for
prosecution is not to be believed, then the court need to know if you are to be
believed. What amounts to casting
aspersions, it is not clear since they will hold it as casting aspersions in
one case and in the other as an integral part of the defence.
Abdulla Katwe V. Uganda
Selvey v. DPP
This was a trial on a charge of
buggery. The defence was that the
complainant was a male prostitute soliciting the appellant. The trial court allowed the appellant to be
cross-examined on previous convictions of indecency. He was convicted and
appealed. The court held that
cross-examination of an accused on previous convictions of bad character was
permissible under the Acct if the nature and conduct of the defence involved
imputations on a prosecution witness notwithstanding that the imputations were
necessary as part of the accused answer to the charge. It also held that the trial court had a
discretion to refuse to permit cross examination of an accused person as to the
previous convictions even though the cross-examination was permissible under
the Act.
Legal opinion seems to suggest that selveY v. dpp overrules it is not clear
when the integral part of defence theory will operate and when it is casting
aspersions. The leeway of discretion on
the part of the judge is that the
In Kenya, and East Africa,
cross-examination on previous antecedents is not permissible if it is vital for
the defence to raise issue of the character of the complainant. Over and above that the court still has discretion
to disallow evidence of previous antecedents if they are casting aspersions on
the complainant, where the way is opened up the courts still have a discretion
to disallow evidence where its probative force is outweighed by its prejudicial
effect.
Immediately
after (d)
S. 57
“provided that the court may …
proviso to S. 57 as well as rendition to the case of Omondi v. R
Paragraph 57 (1) (d)
An accused person can be questioned on his
previous antecedent if he gives evidence against any other person charged with
an offence
Murdoch v. Taylor
Where it was stated that evidence against a
co-accused is evidence for the prosecution against the co accused and it
therefore undermines your defence as an accused person opening up the way for
the prosecution to question him on his previous antecedents.
It is critical that the evidence that a
person gives against the co-accused be supportive of the prosecution case as
this is only when the way is opened to question the person on their previous
antecedents. For evidence of an accused
bad character the sections of 57 (1) (b) .
this is different from what happens after prosecution where the
prosecution can furnish the court with documents of previous antecedents to
assist the courts in sentencing.
OPINION EVIDENCE
What is opinion?
Opinion is defined to mean any inference
which one may draw from perceived data.
It is whatever you infer from what you see, smell, hear, feel etc and
the general rule in evidence is that a witness should confined himself/herself
to what they perceive to leave the court to draw the inferences.
It is however not always possible to
separate perceived facts from opinions in some cases they are intertwined and
it would be impossible to separate the two.
The court might sometimes need the opinion of people better placed than
itself to draw the inferences and it is in these situations that he court
allows the inferences.
E.A. outlines the number of incidences when
the court may be called to draw the inferences where facts and opinions are so
intertwined and the court needs assistance by hearing opinions of experts
better placed that itself. In all
instances where people are called to give opinion evidence, it is a general
rule that evidence be direct.
The first instances is where experts are
called to give evidence, and experts are people that are possessed of special
skills in the field in which they are called to opine or testify and the basis
for admission of expert opinion is S. 48 of the Evidence Act.
R v. Silverlock (1894) 2 QB 766
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